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Ticom/I-29

THIRD INTERROGATION OF OBERSTLTN. FRIEDRICH,  
CHIEF OF THE G.A.F. SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE  
SERVICE

Attached is the report of a further interrogation of Oberstlt. FRIEDRICH, carried out at Beaconsfield on 4th July, 1945.

This report mainly consists of a detailed clarification of Friedrich's earlier misleading statements regarding the breaking of an American "Funkfernseh" system (paras. 1 to 4 and 11); liaison with the Japanese, Finns, Italians and Hungarians (paras. 6 to 9); and the functions of the RLM/Forschungsamt (para. 10).

The previous reports on this prisoner were issued as Ticom/I-13.

Ticom  
7 July, 1945

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Section V (para. 10)  
Dr. Pickering

Interrogation of Oberstlt. FRIEDRICH, chief of GAF 'Y' service (Funkaufklaerung) at Beaconsfield, on 4 July 1945, at 1100 o'clock.

Present: Major J.N. Seaman, AUS  
Major H. Barlow, AUS  
Dr. Pickering, GCCS

1. Reference was made to Friedrich's previous statements about the breaking of an American "Funkfern-schreib" system. See Ticom/I-13. ((Note: as will be seen, the whole difficulty about this claim arose from his use of the quoted term 'teleprinter' when he meant in fact 'undulator', and from a misunderstanding about the terminals of the traffic)). He was asked when the breaking began, and stated that it was shortly after the entry of the U.S. into the war. It was traffic between the War Dept and the regional traffic collecting centers. He could not recall the locations of these centers, but they were all within the United States. They were specifically not in Iceland or Greenland. The transmission was described as teleprinter ((wrong)) short-wave. It was enciphered but was easy to break. It was Morse traffic, not impulse. It was recorded by teleprinter ((i.e. undulator)) on a printed strip as dots and dashes [but see below]. This was enciphered morse, not clear text. He had a special receiver built by a Feldwebel for taking it. It was multi-channel [but see below]; he does not know what kind. The contents of the traffic were: training instructions, development of airfields, and details of selective service processes.

2. He was asked whether this was the traffic from which he had said they got details of ferry flights; it was, particularly details of the preparations for flights and of the routes. The traffic dealt with the bringing of aircraft to assembly points, then their transfer to ferrying ports, and finally with their flights to North Africa, Gibraltar, and later straight to Great Britain.

3. Was the morse just scrambled for transmission, or was there a cipher underneath? Didn't know. After unscrambling the channels, did you have clear text, or was there a further encipherment to solve? Reply: there is a misunderstanding. The multichannel scrambling method to which we referred is the method used by the Americans later on, and which the GAF failed to break, because of lack of apparatus. The traffic in question was originally just plain morse. The new "Tastschritt" affected only the German interception, not us. Asked to define Tastschritt, he said it did not mean "keying speed", but the synchronizing of the intercept equipment with the recorder. He was asked to explain the inconsistency of his referring to the traffic both as teleprinter and as morse. He then drew a picture of an undulator tape, single-channel, and marked off the undulation into successive Morse letters. He said this was what he meant by Funkfern-schreib. Each letter was different from the corresponding clear text letter. He could not remember any of the indicators. The preamble gave ample routing instructions, and enabled them to couple the names of towns with call-signs and personal names. The text itself was very stereotyped, especially the addresses. He did not recall whether clear text was mixed with cipher. He was asked whether they considered it a high-grade system, and replied that they did not, but that there was so much material in it, that if they could have allotted it sufficient time and personnel, they would have got a good deal of valuable information from it. It dealt in addition with the production and development of aircraft. However they had other things to do, and other sources of information, so this material was not fully exploited. We asked what these other sources were. He said all of the ferry-flight air-ground traffic was read by III/LN Rgt 3 also in Sicily and gave expected times of arrival and departure, weather, and strength of groups of planes being ferried.

4. It was asked whether the morse signs on the undulator were converted into letters or figures. They were letters. When did the breaking cease? He found this very difficult to recall. It was long before the invasion of France. We asked if it was before the invasion of North Africa. He said it

was at just about that time, but he could not remember whether it was shortly before or shortly after. Asked what the change was, he could not recall. Was it to teleprinter or to multichannel. He thought it was not teleprinter as he had never had a receiver built which would take that. Question: Then they were still able to intercept it? Yes. In what form? Doesn't know. Still on tape? He thinks so. Who else intercepted this type of traffic--what other units? OKW did. At Husum? No. Dr. Pickering then said that FNAST. 3 (Euskirchen) personnel had told a somewhat similar story ((to be published)). He replied that it was very likely that this was the same traffic, as KAMERON (unit intercepting for GAF) corresponded with Euskirchen on systems which they both worked on. He agreed with the Euskirchen statement that it was a simple substitution. ((Comment: Not too much credit should be placed in this statement, as he was just adopting a suggestion)).

5. Asked what American cipher machines they had captured, he said after much thought that he believed all they ever had was a ciphony device taken from a Mustang. Certainly nothing like their enigma. He was not familiar with the German army references to American "little" and "big" machines. What did he think of the ciphony device? They already knew it was in use from intercept. Only certain units had them. They did not concern themselves with breaking it as the content was unimportant and it could not be acted upon with sufficient speed.

6. Did they have liaison with the Japanese? No. That took place only through OKW/Chi. He thought the liaison was very poor anyhow. He was once told to nominate some personnel for liaison with them but nothing ever came of it. He never had any Japanese attached to his office or sent to him for training.

7. Liaison with the Finns was only on Russian traffic, and even there was confined to T/A and evaluation. There was none on cryptanalysis. He provided the Finns with a detachment which worked at MIKKELI and SORTAVALA. The latter was the headquarters of the Finnish army cryptanalytic organization, which included the air. His men were with a Finnish Colonel HALAMAA. He had no Finns in his office. Asked whether any Finns ever visited him, he said they sometimes paid courtesy calls only. He did not remember the names of any Finnish cryptanalysts.

8. The Italian Chi/Stelle was in the Italian Wehrmacht. The Navy people were the best. The Germans had only an exchange of intelligence results with the Italians, no cryptanalysis. There may also have been some collaboration in the building of OB information from T/A.

9. There was no liaison with Hungary. The Hungarians had two or three Aufklärung companies which they offered to the GAF to cooperate on Eastern cover. Friedrich refused them. He thinks the Hungarians also had units to take Russian army traffic opposite the Hungarian sector. Only reports were exchanged with the Hungarians. The Hungarian reports were worthless, and too old in any case. They looked at them out of courtesy and then filed them.

10. We asked what he could tell us about the RLM Forschungsamt. He said he did not work with them, except to the extent that VOEGELE sometimes met with cryptanalysts from this and other agencies to discuss general problems. The FA furnished GAF with appropriate traffic on occasion. We asked what was the function of the FA? He said its purpose was really hidden from the services, who were not allowed entry to the establishment. Only Voegele had any contact with them, and that only with the cryptanalysts. But Friedrich knows that they carried out monitoring, not only against the enemy but equally against German agencies for political purposes, such as the telephone and telegraph communications of German industries and the Reichspost. He thinks Goering founded it personally. It was completely political, not mili-

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tary. When it worked on foreign systems, it worked only on rear area traffic, such as industrial traffic which it thought the army might not be handling adequately. They worked particularly on inner Russian traffic. Asked if he could name any FA personnel, he said they were always changing. There was a Min.Rat. SCHAPER (with one 'p'), who was not a soldier but a civilian official.

11. With regard to his statement that he had no equipment for receiving U.S. teleprinter traffic, he was asked whether he had such equipment for other teleprinter traffic. He said the Luftwaffe had pulse receivers, but chiefly for radar.